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Introduction 
 
It is both an honor and a pleasure to be invited to Seattle to compare notes 
with you on how the University of Washington and the University of Michigan 
can face the financial challenges of the new millennium.  Actually, it would have 
been more enjoyable if our two institutions could shared experiences while 
competing against each other in the Rose Bowl this New Years.  But thanks to a 
last second field goal, Washington is matched this year against Purdue, and we’ll 
have to use this meeting instead. 
There have long been close relationships and many similarities between 
the University of Washington and the University of Michigan: 
 
1. The University of Washington is the flagship institution in the northwest, 
just as Michigan is the flagship in the midwest. 
2. Our institutions are both regarded as national leaders in research, 
generally ranked one-and-two in the amount of federally funded research 
our faculty attract. 
3. We both have prominent athletic programs, not infrequently facing each 
other on New Year’s Day.  (I’m wearing my Rose Bowl watch from the 
UM victory over UW in the 1993 Rose Bowl.  However I rarely wear the 
Rose Bowl watch from the year before when UW thrashed Michigan 
enroute to a national championship.) 
4. Michigan provided one of Washington’s presidents, Charles Ostergaard, 
while Washington taught Michigan how to do “the wave” in the 1970s. 
 
More apropos of the today’s topic, during the 1980s, Michigan sent a team 
of administrators to visit Washington to compare notes on how to handled deep 
cuts in state appropriations, just as today my visit will focus on some of the 
challenges of financing public universities in the brave, new world of limited 
resources, market forces, and rapidly changing societal needs of the 21st Century. 
I wish I could suggest a magic bullet to handle the financial challenges 
particular to the University of Washington, such as a software tax or a tax on 
dot.com websites.  But there are no easy answers.  Rather, coping with the 
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financial realities of a rapidly changing world will require corresponding 
changes in our institutions. 
To this end I should note that while our universities have many 
similarities in characteristics such as the size, quality, and leadership of our 
various programs, we are remarkably different in the way we finance and 
manage these activities.  Of particular interest here are the differences between 
our institutions in areas such as: 
1. Resource portfolios 
2. Financial reserves 
3. Management cultures 
4. Relationships with state government 
These differences have arisen because of Michigan’s strategy to proceed down a 
somewhat different path in recent decades from most other public universities.  
We have consciously chosen to financially restructure our institution, evolving 
from the character of a “state-supported university” to what one might call a 
“privately-supported public university”. 
While this path may not be attractive or even possible option for the 
University of Washington, it seems useful to describe it to you.  It is, in fact, the 
path being taken by most of the leading public universities east of the Rockies! 
 
A Case Study:  The University of Michigan 
 
Throughout much of the twentieth century the University of Michigan 
benefited from generous state support when a booming automobile industry 
made the Michigan economy unusually prosperous and a time when the 
University of Michigan was the only major university in the state.  However by 
the 1970s, the energy crisis and foreign competition weakened Michigan’s 
industrial economy.  Furthermore, regional needs, ambitious leadership, and 
sympathetic political forces allowed a number of other public colleges in 
Michigan to grow into comprehensive universities, thereby competing directly 
with the University of Michigan for limited state appropriations.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, almost 70 percent of the University’s 
operating budget was provided through state appropriations from general tax 
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revenues.  However, over the past three decades, this has dropped to less than 10 
percent of the University’s total operating budget in the 1990s and less than 20 
percent of its General and Education budget. During this period the University 
of Michigan evolved from “state-supported” to a “state-assisted” to a “state-
related” to, today, what might be only characterized as a “state-located” 
university.  Yet even this last identifier is questionable, since the University has 
campuses around the world, from Hong Kong to Seoul to Sao Paulo to Paris.  In 
fact, the University has launched major new cyberspace “virtual” universities 
that have released it entirely from the constraints of geographical location. One 
of my colleagues suggested that University of Michigan today remains only a 
“state-molested” university, referring to the abuse it sometimes receives from 
opportunistic state politicians.   
Perhaps a better way to phrase this is to observe that the University of 
Michigan has become, in effect, a privately-financed public university, supported 
by a broad array of constituencies at the national—indeed, international—level, 
albeit with a strong mission focused on state needs.  Just as a private university, 
it must earn the majority of its support in the competitive marketplace (i.e., via 
tuition, research grants, and gifts).  It allocates and manages its resources much 
as private universities.  Yet it still retains a public character, committed to serving 
the people whose ancestors created it two centuries earlier.  
  This privately financed character actually evolved over a three decade 
period, shaped by increasingly pessimistic estimates of state support and the 
pragmatic vision of a sequence of Michigan presidents and provosts, including 
Robben Fleming, Frank Rhodes, Harold Shapiro, and Billy Frye.  But it took on a 
heightened urgency in the late 1980s and early 1990s when our leadership team 
faced even dimmer prospects for state support.   
To confirm our concerns, we conducted an array of focus groups and 
conversations with state leaders in the public and private sector.  Each group was 
asked to challenge the following two premises:  
 
1) Because of the limited will and capacity to support higher education, and in 
the face of a weakened economy and other social needs, the state would, at 
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best, be able to support higher education at the level of a regional four-year 
college—not at the level of a world-class research university.   
 
2) Further, political pressures would make it increasingly difficult for state 
government to give priority to state support for flagship institutions.  Instead, 
strong forces would equalize state appropriation per student across all state 
universities.  
 
In the end, few of our state leaders were able to disagree with our premises.  All 
believed that the University's only prudent course was to assume that state 
support would continue to deteriorate throughout the 1990s. 
With this "reality check" behind us, we set out to develop a business plan 
based upon the following objectives:   
 
1) To build alternative revenue streams (tuition, federal grants and 
contracts, auxiliary enterprises, and private giving) to levels sufficient to 
compensate for the loss in state support while building reserves sufficient 
to allow us to ride out the inevitable economic storms;  
 
2)To deploy our resources far more effectively than we had in the past by 
focusing on quality at the possible expense of breadth and capacity, and 
while striving to improve efficiency and productivity; and  
 
3) To enhance the University’s ability to control its own destiny by 
defending our constitutional autonomy and building strong political 
support for our independence. 
 
Let me consider each component of our restructuring strategy in turn: 
 
Diversifying the Revenue Base 
 
State appropriation had been a declining share of the University’s revenue 
base for many years, with State of Michigan falling from among the top five 
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states in the nation in its support of higher education in the 1960s to the bottom 
third of the states in the 1980s. Hence, while we had some hope that we would be 
able to protect higher education in Michigan against the massive cuts in state 
appropriation experienced in other states such as California, Ohio, and New 
York, it was also unlikely that we would see any real growth in state support in 
the short term.  Indeed, from a planning point of view, the very best we could 
expect was to see state appropriations for the University track the inflation rate 
during the 1990s. State support was likely to continue to decline as a percentage 
of our resource base for the foreseeable future. 
Sponsored research funding from federal and industrial sources played an 
important role in our strategies.  We took a number of steps to provide faculty 
members with both the encouragement and support to seek research funding.  
For example, we developed policies which would provide principal investigators 
with discretionary dollars correlated with the amount of indirect cost recovery 
on their grants.  Substantial resources were committed to the development of 
specialized research facilities such as wet laboratories, electron microscopes, and 
clean rooms.  We opened and staffed a permanent office in Washington to more 
effectively lobby for university research. 
Largely as a result of these and other actions, the University’s sponsored 
research activity increased very rapidly throughout the late 1980s and 1990s.  In 
1992, the University of Michigan joined the University of Washington as  one of 
the nation’s leading research university as measured by research expenditures, 
which today amount to over $500 million per year.  
Tuition was another critical component of our strategy.  While non-
resident tuition rates were essentially at private levels and therefore constrained 
by the private marketplace, in-state tuition rates were quite low, particularly 
when measured against the costs of institutions of comparable quality. State 
support had by this time eroded to the point at which it could no longer 
compensate for the difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition for those 
Michigan residents enrolled in the University.  The University's aggressive 
efforts to maintain strong financial aid programs in the face of rising educational 
costs had protected the principle that any Michigan residents academically 
qualified to enter the institution would have their demonstrated financial need 
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met.  Indeed, when the financial aid provided to in-state undergraduate students 
was taken into account, it was clear that the average discounted tuition had 
remained remarkably stable during a period in which state support had 
plummeted. 
Clearly, given the inadequate subsidy of both the costs of education of 
Michigan residents and the needs of the University, we saw many compelling 
reasons why in-state tuition should be increased.  We calculated the potential of 
this revenue source this way:  If one assumes a difference of $17,000 - $6,000 = 
$11,000  between average out-of-state and in-state tuition levels, then the gross 
tuition potential for the roughly 22,000 Michigan residents enrolled at UM-AA is 
22,000 x $11,000 = $242 million.  Of course, the University's commitment to broad 
access would require that a certain fraction, say one-third, of these dollars go into 
increased financial aid.  But even so, this would yield an estimated potential 
additional tuition revenue of $160 million per year.  Note as well as that one 
could realize additional tuition revenue either by increasing in-state tuition levels 
to a higher fraction of out-of-state levels, or by modifying the in-state/out-of-
state enrollment ratio. 
What was a realistic goal for additional tuition revenue?  Although the 
present in-state tuition was less than 30 percent that of out-of-state, historically it 
had been closer to 40 percent to 50 percent, even with significantly higher state 
support.  Further, although the in-state/out-of-state ratio of our undergraduate 
student body was at 70 percent/30 percent, it had historically averaged closer to 
60 percent/40 percent.  Our target for the near term would be to adjust to be 
approximately 40% of out-of-state tuition, while the target  for percentages of 
instate and outstate undergraduates was set at 60%/40%. The in-state/out-of-
state enrollment adjustment would generate $24 million/year, while the increase 
in in-state tuition would generate $44 million/year.  (Here I might note that 
while we were on track toward this target by the mid-1990s, my successor has 
encountered stronger political resistance from our Regents and had to back off to 
more modest 30%-30% level, with very significant financial implications.) 
Private giving was also critical to our strategy. Although we had long 
regarded private giving as providing the margin of excellence for our academic 
programs, we concluded that it would increasingly provide a substantial 
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component of the base support as well. In 1990, the University began working 
toward the goal that by the end of the decade, the annual level of private 
support, that is, private giving plus distributions from endowment, would 
exceed state appropriations.  This would require increasing private support to 
more than $300 million per year by the end of the decade.   
Key in this effort was the launch of a $1 billion fund-raising campaign, the 
largest in the history of public higher education, which succeeded in raising $1.4 
billion. By the end of the decade, private support of the University had risen to 
over $380 million per year ($230 million per year of private giving plus $150 
million from endowment distribution), far exceeding our original target. 
The funds generated by auxiliary units of the University, particularly the 
University Hospitals, were the fastest growing component of our resource base 
through the past decade. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the University 
Hospitals were able to generate very significant bottom-line margins in the range 
of $60 M to $100 M per year.  Yet these were also the most uncertain of our 
resources because of the rapidly changing national health care environment, 
which leads me to a second topic:  reserve funds. 
 
 The Importance of Reserves 
 
 Many public colleges and universities have been forced to operate in a 
hand-to-mouth mode, totally dependent on state largesse from appropriation 
cycle to appropriation cycle, with little funding capacity to respond to unusual 
challenges or opportunities.  Indeed, some public institutions have even been 
required to return unexpended appropriations to the state treasury at the end of 
the fiscal year. 
 Yet the obligations of the public university are far too significant to leave 
to the whims of the legislative appropriation process, at least for the short term.  
Students must be educated.  Patients must be treated.  There are federal 
obligations for research grants and contracts to be fulfilled.  And the university 
must respond to a host of other important services to both the public and private 
sector.  Moreover, while costs structures are generally both relatively fixed and 
straightforward to estimate, the revenues associated with many activities such as 
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patient care in hospitals or television income for athletic events can be quite 
unpredictable.  For this reason, prudent management would suggest the wisdom 
of building significant reserves in the accounts associated with key activities. 
 At the University of Michigan, where we had sufficient autonomy from 
state controls to allow us to manage our own financial affairs, we made it a very 
high priority to accumulate sufficient reserves to protect both the university and 
its programs and employees in the event of a serious downturn in state support.  
We had learned a hard lesson from the difficult days of the late 1970s and 1980s 
when a serious recession reduced state appropriations by roughly 30%, 
necessitating traumatic budget cuts, program reductions, and staff downsizing.  
To this end, we used expenditure control to build reserves in both operating and 
capital academic accounts at both the central and department level.  
Furthermore, we used excess revenues during prosperous years to build reserves 
in the accounts of volatile auxiliary activities to levels such that the interest 
earned by investing these reserves would cover any conceivable shortfall in 
revenues.  For example, in Intercollegiate Athletics, we tried to carry reserves of 
at least $25 to $30 M, while for the University Hospitals, we built reserves to over 
$1 billion.  In both cases, the reserves were roughly comparable to one year of 
total revenue. 
 Of comparable importance to the financial strength of public universities 
are endowment funds.  Endowments are contributed funds, held and invested by 
the university in perpetuity, whose proceeds are dedicated for a particular 
purpose such as supporting a distinguished faculty member (an endowed 
professorial chair), a student (an endowed scholarship or fellowship), or perhaps 
an academic program. Generally the benefactor’s name is associated with the 
endowed activity. Through sophisticate asset management and aggressive fund-
raising, we were able to increase our endowments during the 1990s by more than 
ten-fold, from $200 million to over $3.4 billion in 2000. 
 While such reserves had an important impact on our capacity to 
effectively manage the university in the face of the inevitable and unpredictable 
challenges and opportunities, they also had a second important benefit.  They 
allowed us to make the case for higher credit ratings from Wall Street agencies 
such as Moody’s and Standard and Poors, thereby allowing us to issue debt 
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through bonds and other instruments at lower interest rates.  More specifically, 
as the University achieved a more balanced revenue portfolio and built its 
reserves to significant levels, we became one of the first two public universities 
(the University of Texas being the other) to achieve the highest credit ratings of 
Aaa, something that heretofore only elite private universities such as Harvard 
and Princeton had been able to achieve. 
 
Resource Allocation and Cost Containment 
 
But, of course, diversifying the resource base of the University and 
building reserve accounts were strategies only on the income side of the ledger.  
was only one element of the strategy.  Effective cost containment and wise 
management of resources were also important features.  Through aggressive 
efforts such as total quality management and process reengineering, we reduced 
the administrative costs of the University to among the lowest of our public and 
private peers. For example, broad strategic planning activities in the Office of the 
Provost and the Office of the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer and the 
transformation process of the University Hospitals led to the implementation of 
an effective University-wide total quality management program (M-Quality).   
The University restructured and repositioned the management of both its 
endowment and operating capital.  It moved toward more realistic pricing of 
University services, through increased tuition and fees and the negotiation of 
indirect cost rates for sponsored research.  And in 1996, we brought up the 
necessary administrative systems to allow the implementation of a new resource 
and cost allocation system, responsibility-centered management.   
Many universities—particularly public universities—have relied for 
decades on a system of resource allocation best described as “incremental 
budgeting” based on a fund-accounting system.1  In this system, a unit begins 
each fiscal year with the same base level of support it had received the previous 
year, incremented by some amount reflecting inflation, a unit’s additional needs 
and aspirations, and the university’s capacity to provide additional funds.  These 
resources are partitioned into specific funds, more determined by historic 
traditions than strategic management, e.g., the General and Education Fund, 
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Restricted Fund, Restricted Expendable Fund, Auxiliary Fund, and Capital Fund.  
Beyond simply serving as an accounting tool, firewalls are constructed between 
these funds to limit transfers. 
This system worked well enough during the three decades following 
World War II when the increases in public support outpaced inflation. 
Universities had the additional dollars each year to launch many new initiatives, 
to do many important new things, without disturbing the resource stream to 
ongoing activities.  But, with the erosion in public support—particularly state 
support—that began to occur in the late 1970s and has continued through today, 
it has become apparent that such incremental budgeting/fund accounting 
approaches are increasingly incapable of meeting new challenges and 
opportunities.  Indeed, in the face of a more limited resource base, they 
eventually lead to the starvation of all university activities.   
The more constrained resource base facing higher education during the 
1990s and beyond will force many institutions to abandon incremental budgeting 
if they are to preserve their core values, mission, and character.  Universities 
must retain the capacity to set priorities and allocate resources to these priorities.  
There are many ways to do this.  One can continue to implement targeted 
resource reallocation based upon decisions made by the central administration, 
assisted by faculty advisory groups.  But in most universities today, not only are 
most costs incurred at the unit level, but this is also where most of the 
institution’s revenues are generated.  Hence centralized resource-management 
schemes are incompatible with the realities of highly decentralized resource 
generation and expenditure. 
An alternative is to totally decentralize resource management, that is, to 
institute an “every tub on its own bottom (ETOB)” strategy, similar to that used 
at Harvard and several other private institutions.  Each unit has full authority 
and responsibility for its financial operation.  A serious drawback is that it is 
difficult to address university-wide values or objectives with such a highly 
decentralized approach. 
The University of Michigan chose a hybrid approach known as 
responsibility center management.2  This is a financial management process that 
shares the resource allocation decisions through a partnership between academic 
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units, administrative units, and the central administration. More specifically, 
responsibility center management is aimed at three objectives.  First, it enables 
resource allocation decisions to be driven by the values, core missions, and 
priorities of the university rather than dictated by external forces.  Second, since 
it replaces the traditional fund-accounting systems by an accurate knowledge of 
the true resource flows throughout the university, it provides a far more strategic 
framework for allocation decisions. Finally, responsibility center management 
allows both academic and administrative units to participate, as full partners 
with the central administration, in making these resource allocation decisions 
In its simplest form, responsibility center management allows units to 
keep the resources they generate.  It holds them responsible for meeting the costs 
they incur.  It then levies a tax on all expenditures to provide a central pool of 
resources necessary to support central operations (such as the university library) 
while providing the additional support needed by academic units unable to 
generate sufficient resources to support their activities. It differs from ETOB 
models in that the central administration retains control over significant general 
university resources–in Michigan’s case, our $300 million state appropriation–to 
use for subsidizing priorities such as undergraduate education and academic 
units such as the arts while allowing us to better respond to institutional 
opportunities and challenges, that is, to steer the ship. 
It is clear that the highly centralized, incremental budgeting accompanied 
by fund-accounting systems may no longer suffice in the rapidly changing 
resource environment of the contemporary university.  Moving from crisis to 
crisis or subjecting institutions to gradual starvation through across-the-board 
cuts simply are not adequate long-term strategies. 
 
Planning and Financial Management 
 
Over the past decade, it has become increasingly clear that universities 
must develop more effective financial management systems, capable of 
sustaining their core missions—teaching, research, and service—in the face of the 
rapid changes occurring in their resource base.  Good managers will make good 
(cost-effective) decisions when they are provided with the necessary information 
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and proper incentives.  The first challenge for a university is to select good 
managers and to provide training for them.  The second challenge is to identify 
the appropriate level at which decision-making authority should lie with respect 
to each type of decision.  If it is at too high a level there may not be an 
understanding of the primary impact on the unit or individuals (e.g., if the 
president were to assign faculty to courses).  If it is at too low a level there may 
not be an understanding of the secondary impact on related units or individuals 
(e.g., if each faculty member were to choose his or her own courses). 
The most dramatic change will have to be in the way universities plan.  It 
will be necessary to start all planning exercises with significantly tightened and 
restrictive revenue assumptions.  No longer will it be feasible—or even 
acceptable—to develop expenditure budgets first and then to close the gap 
between expenditure plans and revenue projections by a price increase (e.g., 
tuition).  There will have to be much more care in setting priorities, along with a 
painful acknowledgment that in order to do something new we generally will 
have to eliminate something old.  Innovation by substitution, not growth by 
incremental resources, will have to become the operative management 
philosophy.  For instance, an academic unit that wishes to embrace a new sub-
field of its basic discipline may be required to phase out some other activity in 
order to make room for the new endeavor.  
Underlying nearly all of these comments is the fundamental premise that 
we cannot afford to engage in planning which is always "cost-plus" in nature.  
We cannot always start with where we are in a given unit and allocate existing 
resources to ongoing activities, and then depend on additional resources to 
undertake a new or innovative activity.  We must instead consider eliminating, 
reducing, or otherwise changing a current activity to make budgetary room for 
the new activity that we believe to be important. 
Key in this phase of financial restructuring was the building of effective 
leadership and management teams, extending from the Executive Officers to the 
lowest management levels. The Executive Officers of the University accepted the 
leadership responsibility for the various initiatives proposed by the business 
plan.  Key in this effort were the roles played by the three senior officers, the 
president, provost, and chief financial officer in these strategic efforts. 
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Some General Observations Concerning the 1990s Business Plan 
 
The University of Michigan’s bold plan for financial restructuring during 
the 1990s was remarkably successful.  Although state appropriations declined to 
less than 10% of our operating budget, the diversification of our revenue 
portfolio, the restructuring of our cost structures, and the implementation of 
sophisticated mechanisms for managing the financial, physical, and human 
assets of the university enabled us to become one of the strongest public 
universities in the nation (as measured both in financial terms by Wall Street and 
in academic quality terms by an array of rankings). 
One of the great challenges the University faced through the 1980s was the 
need to upgrade an aging physical plant.  A combination of low interest rates 
and construction costs, state capital outlay, private support, and support from 
auxiliary activities finally enabled the University to launch a massive $2 billion to 
rebuild most of the facilities on its four campuses. While the rebuilding and/or 
major renovation of most of the campus during the past decade was an 
extraordinary accomplishment, of comparable importance was the massive effort 
to eliminate the deferred maintenance backlog that arose during the 1970s and 
1980s.  Further, major efforts were made to provide ongoing support for facilities 
maintenance so that such backlogs would not arise in the future. Note that key in 
these efforts was our ability to arbitrage by using our top credit rating to borrow 
construction funds at low interest rates, and then re-invest these funds in high 
earning endowment accounts during the period of construction. 
Of course part of this shift was due to the University’s great success in 
using its reputation not only to compensate for eroding state support, but to 
actually increase its resource base from alternative revenue sources such as 
student tuition, federal research support, private giving, and the income from 
auxiliary activities such as its hospitals, while building substantial reserves and 
endowment to protect the University from fluctuations in the economy.  In 
parallel with this shift in resource base–and in some ways, driving it–was the 
implementation of a highly decentralized system of resource acquisition and 
control, in which both the academic and administration units were given both 
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authority and responsibility for both generating resources and controlling 
expenditures.  Key to this strategy was the University’s unusual constitutional 
autonomy that enabled it to control revenue sources such as tuition while 
adopting far more effective methods of resource allocation and cost containment. 
As a result, today the University of Michigan has become recognized as a leader 
in developing and executing the strategy of “privatizing” its resource base. 
We believed it extremely important to pursue a balanced strategy.  Our 
three primary objectives were to increase resources available to the University, to 
constrain costs and enhance the quality of the University, and to protect the 
assets (financial, physical, human) of the University.  We needed to achieve a 
balance among the attention, energy, and effort directed at each objective. 
External public perceptions at the state level, and their consequent 
political implications, threatened our strategic efforts.  For example, there 
seemed little understanding at the grassroots level of the importance of the 
University of Michigan and its impact on the state.  Further, there was growing 
hostility toward the independence of the University, fueled, in part, by public 
concerns about the costs of education and the rise of populist, anti-intellectual 
attitudes.  And, of course, there is remarkably little public awareness of either the 
true costs—not to mention the value—of a quality college education, or of the 
serious erosion in state support of this activity. 
The ever-broadening mission of the University, along with its increasingly 
complex and interwoven array of constituencies, suggested that we need to 
rethink how we managed the institution.  In the past, we had taken great pride in 
lean management, relying heavily on academic and relatively inexperienced 
leadership.  In reality, by 2000 the University had become a $3.5 billion per year 
enterprise, with another $6 billion under active management. We were 
comparable in size and complexity to Fortune 500 company.  Further, for the past 
decade the University had grown at over a 10 percent per year compound rate.  
As our society became ever more knowledge-dependent, the University might be 
expected to grow even more rapidly in the years ahead.   
It was clear that we needed to think more carefully and extensively about 
the management of the University.  For example, we asked ourselves whether we 
needed to encourage the Board of Regents to evolve more rapidly into a true 
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“board of directors,” complete with a standard committee structure (Audit, 
Compensation and Organization, Finance, etc.).  Did we need to intensify our 
efforts to ensure greater accountability across the University with additional 
audit operations, tracking and information-management systems?  Did we need 
to recruit a more experienced management team to handle the complexities of 
the UM, Inc.?  Did we need to provide more formal training for all faculty 
moving into key management positions (department chairs, directors, deans), 
e.g., through the Executive Education program in the School of Business 
Administration? 
Finally, we seriously questioned whether we were thinking boldly 
enough.  While the business plan we developed and implemented moved the 
University forward quite rapidly, there was nevertheless a growing concern that 
we should have been more aggressive.  Perhaps we were thinking too narrowly, 
constrained by the mindset of a university of some distant past which did not 
even resemble the university of today, much less that of the next century. 
 
Some Comparisons:  UW vs. UM 
 
Similarities 
 
• The University of Washington and UM-Ann Arbor are comparable in size 
(with 37,000 students, although UM-AA is somewhat more graduate-
intensive). 
 
• Both of us receive about the same level of state appropriation ($300 
million) or about $8,200 per student. 
 
• Both of us have experienced a decline both in the percentage of state 
General Fund appropriations for higher education and a decline in our 
share of these appropriations as other Michigan public colleges and 
universities competed for a larger share of pot. 
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• Both institutions are national leaders in sponsored research, receiving 
about $450 million a year from government sources. 
 
• Both of us have medical centers, although UM-AA is about three times the 
size of UW in revenues ($1.1 billion/year). 
 
Differences 
 
Our revenue portfolios are quite different, however, in three respects: 
 
• First, UM-AA generates over $510 million in tuition revenue compared to 
$217 million for UW.   
 
• Second, UM-AA’s private fund-raising seems a bit more aggressive, 
raising over $200 million last year (and completing a $1.4 billion campaign 
in 1997). 
 
• Third, our income from endowment is considerably higher, amounting to 
over $150 million (at payout rates of 4.5% on a $3.5 billion endowment). 
 
As a result, although we have comparable enrollments, UM-AA has a 
considerably large budget than UW: 
 
      Total   G&E 
 
UM    $2.86 B  $1.71 M 
UW    $1.67 B  $1.37 M 
 
This translates into considerably higher faculty salaries and program quality 
(UM typically ranks with UC-Berkeley among publics and comparable to the top 
10 private universities in both faculty salaries and program quality). 
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Tuition and Financial Aid Policies:  
 
UM-AA sets both its own tuition levels and its instate-outstate student mix.  Our 
instate students pay tuition from $7,000 instate UG to $20,000 for some 
professional programs.  Outstate students pay tuition comparable to private 
institutions, ranging from $20,000 UG to $30,000 professional.  We have been able 
to maintain outstate student enrollments of 30% to 35% undergraduate and well 
over 50% at the graduate and professional level. 
 
However, we also have a need-blind admission policy coupled with a long-
standing commitment to meet the full financial need of any Michigan resident 
enrolling in our undergraduate programs.  (Total financial aid expenditures 
amount to over $150 million.) 
 
Reserves and Debt Financing 
 
We have intentionally build up very substantial reserves for those activities 
characterized by unpredictable revenue streams (e.g., university hospitals and 
intercollegiate athletics).  This, coupled with conservative financial management, 
have enable us to achieve the highest Aaa credit rating, allowing us to do debt 
financing at extremely low rates. 
 
Management Culture 
 
We are very highly decentralized in our financial management.  Our 
responsibility center management system is essentially an “every tub on its own 
bottom” system with the exception that the central administration controls the 
allocation of the state appropriation (some $300 million per year). 
 
Institutional Autonomy 
 
In contrast to UW, UM-AA has leveraged its constitutional autonomy over the 
years to give us (or at least our Regents) essentially complete control over all 
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aspects of the University, from student admission and enrollment to tuition to 
financial management.  To be sure, state government can determine the 
magnitude of our state appropriation each year, but it cannot dictate how we use 
these funds.  (Besides, they currently amount to only about 10% of our total 
budget and 17% of our General and Education budget.) 
Note, we have occasionally found it necessary to sue the state (very 
politely and diplomatically, to be sure) to reassert this autonomy.  We are careful 
to challenge the state’s authority only in areas that are not only important to the 
University but where we believe we can win in the courts so that our autonomy 
is reinforced. 
 
The Broader Landscape 
 
The financing of the university–the structure of its internal costs, the 
pricing of its educational products, the acquisition of the resources necessary to 
support its activities–has become the center of a national debate.  The rising costs 
of higher education during a period of stagnant or declining public support and 
the consequent increases in tuition have triggered great concern about both the 
access to and quality of higher education.  Nowhere is this debate more intense 
than in public universities, where most of the nation’s college students are 
educated.   
The ever-increasing costs of the university should not be surprising in 
view of the exponential increase in knowledge and the growing educational 
needs of our society.  The demands upon our public colleges and universities 
continue increase, with the population college age students growing once again 
while the needs of adult learners are expanding rapidly.  States expect public 
universities to provide the basic and applied research so important to economic 
growth in a technology-dependent economy.  The needs for professional services 
in areas such as health care, technology transfer, and extension all continue to 
grow.  Yet, state governments are less inclined to provide the funding increases 
necessary to allow public universities to response to these growing needs of a 
knowledge-driven society in the face of other social priorities such as crime, 
health care, and K-12 education. 
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Beyond this issue of public priorities is a continuing struggle to assign the 
values of higher education to the public vis-a-vis the individual, by asking the 
classic questions of “Who benefits?” and  “Who pays?”  As a nation we seem to 
be in the process of replacing an earlier social contract that views higher 
education as a public good, benefiting society at large and hence deserving of 
public support, with a view of a college education instead as primarily an 
individual benefit that should be financed through the marketplace 
It seems clear that the financial challenges to the public university require 
a serious rethinking and possibly even restructuring of all of its financial 
activities, from asset acquisition and allocation to financial management to cost 
containment.: 
 
• Universities need to explore new financial models that strive to build far 
more diversified funding portfolios, less dependent upon state 
appropriations, that enable public universities not only to increase the 
resources available for academic program support but moreover provide 
resilience against the inevitable ebb and flow of state support.   
 
• Universities need to build adequate reserve capacity, both in the budgets 
of operating units and through endowment accounts.   
 
• The allocation and management of resources, the containment of costs, 
and the adoption of efficiency measures common from business such as 
systems re-engineering and total quality management are important 
strategies 
 
• But perhaps most significant is an entirely new approach to financial 
management, responsibility, and accountability that will enable the public 
university to thrive during a period of constrained public support.  
 
• Public universities must break free those traditions that depend heavily 
upon generous state support, and instead manage their financial affairs 
much as private universities.  They must become more entrepreneurial 
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and proactive, seeking both the resources and the autonomy that will 
allow them to thrive in spite of the vicissitudes of public funding.  In a 
sense, they must become privately financed and privately managed public 
universities. 
 
Financial Management, Responsibility, and Accountability 
 
Despite the fact that in many ways, the public university has become one 
of the most complex institutions in modern society—far more complex, for 
example, than most corporations or governments—its management could best be 
described as “amateur.”  That is, although competent professionals have usually 
been sought to manage key administrative areas such as investments, finances, 
and accounting, the general leadership, management, and governance of the 
university has been the responsibility of either academics or lay board members.  
In fact, many universities take great pride in the fact that they not only are led 
and managed by “true academics” with little professional experience, but also 
governed by lay boards with little business or educational experience. 
Today the typical public university affects the lives not simply of 
thousands of students and faculty but thousands more staff members and 
hundreds of thousands of community and state citizens that depend upon its 
critical services such as education, health care, and economic development.  
Furthermore, these institutions attract and expend billions of dollars of public 
and private funds.  We can no longer pretend that the detached, amateurish 
academic leadership model is sufficient.  Nor is it any longer sufficient to rely 
upon politically selected lay boards for their governance.  Like other major 
institutions in our society, we must demand new levels of accountability of the 
university for the integrity of its financial operations, the quality of its services, 
and the stewardship of its resources.  
Although some universities still draw much of their leadership from 
academic ranks, more and more are recognizing that the vast scope, complexity, 
and impact of these institutions requires the presence of talented and qualified 
management professionals.  Too much is at stake, both for the institution and the 
society it serves, to tolerate the limited experience and business acumen of the 
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academy.  In fact, there are increasing calls for more formal training in business 
and management for all of those in academic administration, from presidents to 
deans to department chairs.  Too many people depend upon their decisions; too 
many dollars are involved; too much legal liability is at stake, to rely upon the 
limited management experience of most academics. 
Yet, even with adequate training and experience, the administration of the 
public university faces many challenges.  Most institutions lack serious financial 
planning–which is not surprising given that the academy resists any suggestion 
that academic units should develop a business plan.  Universities are plagued by 
a serious incompatibility in the responsibility and authority assigned to those in 
administration.  All too often those charged with the responsibility for various 
activities simply are not provided with the authority to carry out these tasks.  By 
the same token, many with relatively little responsibility have great authority to 
prevent decisive action.  Little wonder that the university administration is 
frequently unable and unwilling to tackle major issues such as the downsizing or 
elimination of obsolete programs in order to free up resources for new initiatives.  
Sacred cows such as intercollegiate athletics continue to graze on the core 
academic programs of the institution. 
This mismatch between authority and responsibility can be attributed to 
many factors, for instance, a faculty culture that resists strong leadership, or the 
relatively short tenure of most academic administrators.  But ultimately all of 
these factors trace to the political nature and the limited experience of the 
governing boards at most public institutions.  In a legal sense, the governing 
board of a public university is responsible for its integrity.  They have a fiduciary 
responsibility for its financial operations, as well as a legal responsibility for its 
welfare.  Yet, this responsibility exists largely in theory and not practice, since 
board members are rarely held personally accountable for their actions.  Indeed, 
governing boards as bodies are rarely evaluated with respect to their competence 
and actions. 
Most governing boards of public universities are determined through 
political processes.  Members are either appointed by public leaders or elected 
through partisan political processes.  Political factors are far more important that 
expertise or institutional commitment in determining board members.  Once 
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appointed or elected, board members generally serve for long terms–typically 6 
to 10 years–subject only to a recall action taken by the electorate or removal for 
malfeasance by the courts.  There is ample evidence to suggest that, for all 
practical purposes, board members are effectively isolated from accountability 
for even the most blatant incompetence or grievous misbehavior.3  Political 
accountability falls far short of true fiduciary accountability. 
This should be contrasted with the liability of directors of a major corporation, 
who can be held not only personally liable for their board decisions and actions, 
but can be removed in a timely fashion by a vote of the shareholders.  
Furthermore, the governing boards of private universities can deal with 
unsatisfactory performance by removing any of their members through board 
action.  Not so for the members of public governing boards, who can be removed 
only by action of the electorate or the governor–and then only when their term 
has expired. This absence of direct accountability of the governing board is one 
of the most serious factors in leading to weak management and leadership of 
public universities. 
 
The Privatization of Public Higher Education in America 
 
 Today in the face of limited resources and more pressing social priorities, 
the century-long expansion of public support of higher education has slowed. 
While the needs of our society for advanced education can only intensify as we 
evolve into a knowledge-driven world culture, it is not evident that these needs 
will be met by further growth of our existing system of public universities.  
 The terms of the social contract that led to these institutions are changing 
rapidly. The principle of general tax support for public higher education as a 
public good and the partnership between the federal government and the 
universities for the conduct of research are both at risk. These changes are being 
driven in part by increasingly limited tax resources and the declining priority 
given higher education in the face of other social needs.4 
 We now have at least two decades of experience that would suggest that 
the states are simply not able—or willing—to provide the resources to sustain 
growth in public higher education, at least at the rate experienced in the decades 
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following World War II. In many parts of the nation, states will be hard pressed 
to even sustain the present capacity and quality of their institutions. Little 
wonder that public university leaders are increasingly reluctant to cede control 
of their activities to state governments. Some institutions are even bargaining for 
more autonomy from state control as an alternative to growth in state support, 
arguing that if granted more control over their own destiny, they can better 
protect their capacity to serve the public. 
Most pessimistically, one might even conclude that America’s great 
experiment of building world-class public universities supported primarily by 
tax dollars has come to an end. Put another way, the concept of a world-class, 
comprehensive state university might not be viable over the longer term, at least 
in terms of an institution heavily dependent upon state appropriations. It simply 
may not be possible to justify the level of tax support necessary to sustain the 
quality of these institutions in the face of other public priorities, such as health 
care, K-12 education, and public infrastructure needs—particularly during a time 
of slowly rising or stagnant economic activity.5 
One obvious consequence of declining state support is that the several of 
the leading public universities may increasingly resemble private universities in 
the way they are financed and managed. They will move toward higher tuition-
high financial aid strategies. They will use their reputation, developed and 
sustained during earlier times of more generous state support, to attract the 
resources they need from federal and private sources to replace declining state 
appropriations.  Put another way, many will embrace a strategy to become 
increasingly privately financed, even as they strive to retain their public 
character.   
In such “privately financed, public universities” only a small fraction of 
operating or capital support will come from state appropriations. Like private 
universities, these hybrid institutions will depend primarily upon revenue they 
generate directly from their activities—tuition, federal grants and contracts, 
private gifts, and revenue from auxiliary services such as health care—rather 
than upon direct appropriations.  They will manage these resources much as 
private universities, moving toward more decentralized “tub-on-their-own-
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bottom” budgeting philosophies in which their academic units have both the 
responsibilities and incentives for generating resources and containing costs. 
State universities choosing–or forced–to undergo this “privatization” 
transition in financing must appeal to a broad array of constituencies at the 
national and global level, while continuing to exhibit a strong mission focused on 
state needs. In the same way as private universities, they must earn the majority 
of their support in the competitive marketplace, i.e., via tuition, research grants, 
and gifts, and this will sometimes require actions that come into conflict from 
time to time with state priorities. Hence the autonomy of the public university 
will become one of its most critical assets, perhaps even more critical that state 
support for some institutions. 
Several public universities such as the University of Michigan and the 
University of Virginia are well down this road.  Several other leading public 
research universities are likely to follow as state appropriations continue to 
decline as a fraction of their revenue base. However even if this strategy 
represents a viable option for some of the leading public universities to maintain 
their quality during a time of constrained or declining public support, it does 
raise a number of important issues.  For example, how does one preserve the 
public character of a privately financed institution?  Clearly as a public 
university becomes more independent of the purse strings from state 
appropriations, it becomes less inclined to follow the dictates of state 
government, particularly if it possesses constitutional or statutory autonomy.  No 
longer is its “public” simply the taxpayer, but rather an array of stakeholders 
including parents and students, federal agencies, donors, and business and 
industry.  Such privately-supported public universities face a particular 
challenge in balancing their traditional public purpose with the pressures of the 
marketplace. 
As we enter the new millennium, there is an increasing sense that the 
social contract between the university and American society may need to be 
reconsidered and perhaps even renegotiated.6 It may be time to consider a new 
social contract, linking together federal and state investment with higher 
education and business to serve national and regional needs, much in the spirit 
of the land-grant acts of the nineteenth century. Key to this effort is our ability as 
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a society to view higher education as, in part, a public good that merits support 
through the investment of public tax dollars. In this way, our nation could best 
protect the public purpose of the higher education enterprise and sustain its 
quality, important traditions, and essential values while better enabling it to 
respond to the needs of a twenty-first century society. 
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